A.S. Radcliff: The Claim of Humanity in Christ (in the Torrance tradition), Post 12

Reference

Radcliff, A.S. 2016. The Claim of Humanity in Christ: Salvation and Sanctification in the Theology of T.F. and J.B. Torrance. (Princeton Theological Monograph Series 222), Eugene, OR: Pickwick. 208 pp.

With this post, we begin to explore Radcliff’s excellent contribution in regard to the place of personal response in the soteriology of the Torrance tradition, the ministry of the Spirit, and the nature of sanctification.

Radcliff cites several critics who argue that the Torrances’ assertion that all humanity is included in the vicarious humanity of Jesus undermines the subjective aspect of union by the Spirit. The critics insist that no one is justified accept by (personal) faith “in” Jesus. In other words, until a person believes, they are not justified. This is, of course, contrary to the Torrance tradition, where all are justified in the incarnation and life of Jesus Christ.

As she often does in this book, Radcliff counters that the insistence on “personal faith in Jesus” throws us back upon ourselves for salvation. Torrance sees this problem in the entire Westminster theology (of conservative Calvinism), where “the main focus of attention is upon man’s appropriation of salvation through justifying faith.” The Westminster tradition is concerned with man’s action, man’s faith, man’s duty toward God.

One Union in Two Relations

As Radcliff notes, there is only one “union” with Christ; that is, humanity is objectively united to Jesus via the incarnation (hypostatic union), wherein the eternal Word, who created all things and in whom “we live and move and exist” (NLT) assumes fallen humanity and unites it forever to his divinity (while purifying and cleansing our fallen flesh throughout his incarnate life).

Comment: The doctrine of the “hypostatic union,” formulated at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 A.D., asserts that Jesus Christ is “one person in two natures” (divine and human). As the Torrances assert, the union of divinity and humanity in the incarnation of Jesus Christ is an atoning union, wherein all humanity is reconciled to God in Jesus. In short, all are included in the incarnation.

Now let’s go back and bring in some material from Chapter 1 of Radcliff’s book. Quoting TF Torrance:

“[T]here is only one union with Christ, that which he wrought out with us in His birth and life and death and resurrection and in which He gives us to share through the gift of the Holy Spirit.”

In other words, “union with Christ” is effected in the incarnation (hypostatic union), as lived out through the whole course of the Son’s obedience to the Father. For Torrance, any notion of “two” unions could present God’s grace as conditional and throw us back upon ourselves to accomplish the spiritual union. For Torrance, the spiritual union is not additional to the union with all humanity effected in the incarnation (hypostatic union). There is only one union, where the spiritual union is understood as a “participation” in the one union established in the incarnation. According to TFT, “If the spiritual union is an additional union, then our salvation depends not only on the finished work of Christ but upon something else as well which has later to be added on to it before it is real for us.”

Comment: In view of his persistent resistance to dualisms of all kinds, TF Torrance does not assert a separation between the work of the Son and the work of the Spirit. While the “work” of the persons of the Trinity can be distinguished, they cannot be separated. As Augustine argues, “the works of the Trinity in the history of salvation are undivided” (opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt).

Nevertheless, the one objective union with Christ achieved in the incarnation has two aspects, expressed in two “relations.” There is an ontological “relation” to Christ and a pneumatological “relation” to Christ. Note that we are describing two “relations,” not two “unions.” Again, there is only one “union.” Our ontological union, accomplished for all humanity in the incarnation (hypostatic union) is a fait accompli. It cannot be undone. “However,” as Radcliff rightly notes, “we can live in ignorance or denial of this or we can live in agreement with it and enjoy its reality.” For the Torrances, it is the role of the Spirit to open us up within our subjectivities for Christ, so that we live out of ourselves and in him. Humanity’s objective union with Christ, established in the incarnate life of Jesus, is subjectively (“personally”) actualized in us by the Spirit.

Therefore, we must hold two things together, as J.B. Torrance argues:

First, he [Jesus] has already taken our humanity into the Holy of Holies, the presence of the Father in his own person. Second, he comes to us today by the Holy Spirit to take us with him into the Holiest of All.

JB may seem a little confusing here. What does he mean, Jesus has already taken humanity into the Most Holy Place, yet he comes today by the Spirit to take us in?

As Radcliff notes, JB Torrance (following Calvin) identifies three “moments” of the one work of salvation. First is the “eternal moment.” This is the moment in eternity past when the Father determined to include humanity in his love. Second is the “historical moment,” two thousand years ago when Christ lived and died and was raised again for us and for our salvation. Third is the “moment of [personal] experience,” when the Holy Spirit unites us to Christ and brings us to personal faith and repentance.

Trinitarian Pattern
(this is my chart, not Radcliff’s)

Father	Eternal moment	determines all for life and love
Son	Historical moment	objective relation of union: Jesus unites all humanity to himself in the incarnation.
Spirit	Experiential moment	Subjective relation of union: Spirit subjectively actualizes in us what has been objectively accomplished in Jesus.

While there are three “moments” of salvation, there is only one union with Christ. However, the one “union” is expressed in two “relations”: ontological and pneumatological. This “unity in distinction” (“one union in two relations”) allows for only one work of salvation, so that we are not thrown back upon ourselves to achieve salvation by a subsequent effort of sanctification. At the same time, this approach posits a distinction between ontological and pneumatological “relations,” so that union with Christ is not collapsed into the hypostatic union with no room left for the work of the Spirit in us personally.

Radcliff continues:

We are in ontological relation to Christ because of his incarnation [hypostatic union] and vicarious humanity. However, an ontological relation alone leads to universalism. J.B. believes that universalism is precluded by the New Testament call for a human response of faith in the Spirit.

In that regard, J.B. Torrance writes:

On the grounds of our ontological relation to Christ, our Second Adam, we are called through the Holy Spirit into union with Him. Without Pentecost and without the sealing of the Holy Spirit in faith, we cannot regard ourselves as members of Christ’s Body and partakers of His blessings.

Contra numerous critics, the Torrances are not universalists. TF Torrance’s assertion of one “union” expressed in two “relations” precludes universalism, for it leaves room for a distinct (not separate) pneumatological relation, wherein the objective union accomplished in Jesus (hypostatic union) is actualized in us personally by the Spirit. Thus, we can say all are objectively included in Jesus via the hypostatic union (“incarnation”) but not all participate until the objective union is subjectively actualized in the individual believer by the ministry of the Spirit.

Comment: Given the one union with Christ that is expressed in two relations (unity in distinction), we have included everyone in Jesus, via the incarnation, while allowing for the actualization of the personal response of faith by the Spirit in order to experience our inclusion. Thus, the spiritual union is  not  collapsed into the hypostatic union. At the same time, there is no dualism (“separation”) between the work of the Son and the work of the Spirit. Both the Son and the Spirit play distinct but not separate roles in the one unitary work of salvation. This is good Trinitarian theology. Union is birthed in the Father’s heart, historically actualized in Jesus and subjectively realized in us by the Spirit.

In regard to one union in two relations, Radcliff quotes Dearborn, who argues that salvation is onto-relational. This is a beautiful concept that we do well to understand. “Onto-relations” are what Torrance calls “being-constituting” relations. In other words, “onto-relations” make us “who we are.” Contra Newton, entities exist not as isolated particles but in webs of relationships, where the relations themselves constitute the “being” of the realities in question. In human terms, our identities as “persons” are determined not only by our existence as distinct individuals but also by the relationships in which we live and move. That is to say, our identity as persons is determined as much by our relationships as it is by our genetics. We are not created to exist as isolated “individuals.” We are created for relationship with God and neighbour. To be human is to be persons-in-relationship.

An onto-relational view of salvation ascribes significance both to the objective ontological transformation of our humanity in Jesus as well as the subjective participation in that transformation by the Spirit. In other words, salvation is not automatic and impersonal, as it would be if it were accomplished solely in the incarnation absent a distinct personalizing work of the Spirit. Nor is it solely relational, as if it were merely an extrinsic encounter through “personal faith” without an ontological transformation of our humanity. In short, salvation is onto-relational because it involves an ontological transformation of our humanity in the incarnation that is realized in each us personally through our relationship to Christ in the Spirit.

Comment: OK. Let me conclude this post with a brief discussion of an issue that troubled (past tense) me for many years. With the Torrances, and Reformed theology in general, I agree that an autonomous response of faith to Jesus is impossible for those who are dead in trespasses and sins. Thus, we can only participate in our salvation by the ministry of the Spirit. No one participates in the objective reality of our union with Christ apart from the work of the Spirit.

Here’s my dilemma, or, at least what used to be my dilemma. Why does the Spirit work in John but not in Mary? Why does the Spirit call John to participate but not Mary? According to the conservative Calvinists, it is because John is “elect” and Mary is toast. According to the Arminians, it is because God foreknew that John would believe and Mary would not. So God zaps John with the Spirit but not Mary. In either of these two scenarios, it ain’t lookin’ good for Mary!

After years of struggle with this issue, I have transcended both viewpoints and entered the happy hunting ground of trans-denominationalism. Today I believe that the Spirit has been poured out on all flesh, as the New Testament indicates. Of course, I do not know all the practical implications of that. I simply believe that the Spirit is drawing all to Jesus in a way that I do not understand and certainly do not see when I watch the evening news. But I firmly believe that God wants all to be saved and none to perish. Thus, in regard to Mary, who has not yet been properly zapped by the Spirit, so that she may experience and enjoy her inclusion, I can only conclude, that, in the eloquent words of fellow blogger, Ted Johnson, the Spirit will bring in Mary “in his own perfect time.” For now, that works for me, and it is markedly better than the Calvinist or Arminian positions.

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For more on the hypostatic union, click here.

For a related post on the “wonderful exchange,” click here.

For more on Torrance’s critic of universalism, click here. 

A.S. Radcliff: The Claim of Humanity in Christ (in the Torrance tradition), Post 5

Reference

Radcliff, A.S. 2016. The Claim of Humanity in Christ: Salvation and Sanctification in the Theology of T.F. and J.B. Torrance. (Princeton Theological Monograph Series 222), Eugene, OR: Pickwick. 208 pp.

Universalism

The Torrance’s insistence on the election of all in Christ and the universal range of atonement attracts the criticism that this leads logically to universalism. Radcliff notes that some have tried to avoid the notion of universalism by positing two “unions,” for example, “carnal” union and “spiritual” union, as advocated centuries ago by John Craig (see TFT’s “Introduction to The School of Faith, pp. cvi ff.). In Craig’s view, everyone has a “carnal” union with Christ by virtue of our common humanity, but only a few are united by the Spirit to Christ and receive the benefits of this union.

TFT, however, perceives a problem with distinguishing two “unions,” because this throws us back on our own efforts to accomplish the spiritual union. Per TFT, “If the spiritual union is an additional union, then our salvation depends not only on the finished work of Christ but upon something else as well which has later to be added on to it before it is real for us.” Torrance insists that “there is only one union with Christ, that which he has wrought out with us in His birth and life and death and resurrection and in which He gives us to share through the gift of the Holy Spirit” (emphasis mine). While this can cause confusion in relation to universalism, notes Radcliff, for Torrance it is better to speak of one union with Christ and not make distinctions that could lead to a misunderstanding of conditional grace. (We will learn more about “distinctions” in the one “union with Christ” in Chapter Three of Radcliff’s book.)

Comment: We see repeatedly in the Torrance tradition an aversion to any doctrine that throws the burden of salvation back upon our own shoulders. For the Torrances, salvation is a fait accompli in Jesus. There is nothing to add to the finished work of Christ. Even our response, as already noted, contributes nothing to our salvation. (This is definitely Reformed  theology!)

Nevertheless, the Torrance’s reject a doctrine of universalism in favor of a doctrine of “universal love.” For the Torrances, notes Radcliff, “universal love” is the positive aspect of universalism; it seeks to uphold the love of God in contrast to what TFT sees in Federal theology to be a subordination of God’s universal love to an over-arching rational, legal framework.

While asserting “universal love, notes Radcliff, Torrance rejects universalism because it does not recognize 1) the urgency of evangelism, 2) the reality of hell, 3) the necessity of mission and 4) the irrational fact of sin. (This is good work on Radcliff’s part.) For Torrance, universalism is flawed because of the awful and absurd reality that the proclamation of the Gospel leads some to harden their hearts. At the same time, TFT does not believe that God sends the “damned” to hell, nor did God create the hell they experience.  In rejecting God’s love for all as revealed in Jesus, the “damned” experience a hell of their own creation. According to TFT, “To say ‘No’ to Jesus is to be held in a hell of one’s own choosing and making. It is not God who makes hell, for hell is the contradiction of all that is God.”

For Torrance, the doctrine of universalism attempts to rationalize the irrational mystery of sin and evil. While we must uphold the doctrine of universal reconciliation, we cannot deny “the terrible bottomless reality of sin.” Thus, “Whether all of humanity will live reconciled with God is a mystery” (TFT).

Logico-causal categories

Critics of the Torrance tradition, notes Radcliff, (usually conservative Calvinists), accuse the Torrances of “logical incoherence,” “obfuscation,” and “irrationalism.” For example, if the Torrance tradition “’logically” leads to universalism and, yet, the Torrance’s deny universalism, are they not being “logically incoherent?” For Letham, Torrance’s appeal to mystery appears to belittle the place of logic. Radcliff quotes Letham in this regard:

It simply will not do to dismiss criticism on this point by assertion that Torrance’s claims stem from a center in God and that the critics have an uncrucified epistemology; this is to break down rational discourse on the basis of a privileged and precious gnosis.

As Radcliff wisely notes, this brings us to the crux of the debate. For the Torrance’s, the essential problem with Federal theology is that human logical constructs are valued (no doubt unwittingly, notes Radcliff) over God’s self-revelation in Christ. For the Torrances, we cannot argue our way to truths about God; rather, we rely wholly on God’s self-revelation in Christ. The Torrance tradition is guided by the concern to look first to “Who” God is as revealed in Jesus and the Sprit in order to understand “how” God acts in salvation history. That means, notes Radcliff, that we must subordinate human rational discourse to what God reveals of himself in Christ.

In the Torrance tradition, the nature of the Object of study prescribes the manner in which it is known. (This is a cardinal principle of TFT’s scientific theology). Therefore, contra Letham and other critics, notes Radcliff, Torrance theology, controlled and guided by its Object of study, is “profoundly internally coherent.”

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For more on Torrance’s view of universalism, reprobation and hell, see my previous post  here.

For more on Torrance’s scientific method of theology, where the method of study is controlled by the nature of the Object of inquiry, see my journal article here. 

For more on logical-causal approaches to knowledge of God that have plagued Western Christianity, see my post here.

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T.F. Torrance: The Atonement, pt. 8

Universalism and Limited Atonement

Comment: Barth and Torrance are often wrongly "accused" of being universalists. They are not. Apparently critics don't take the time to differentiate between universal atonement and universalism.

Torrance’s assertion that God has chosen all humanity in Jesus Christ, coupled with his insistence on the universal range of atoning reconciliation, may lead to the erroneous conclusion that he is a “universalist,” that is, one who believes in the salvation of all mankind (Bloesch, 2004:14, 39, 40). In this regard, an examination is needed of his rejection of both “universalism” and the doctrine of “limited atonement.” As will become plain, Torrance’s argument against a doctrine of limited atonement is directly related to his rejection of the “Latin heresy” described in a previous post (March 9, 2011), particularly in regard to his repudiation of atonement as an “external” rather than ontological reality.

As Torrance notes, the argument for either universal salvation or limited atonement is commonly cast as follows: If Christ died for all, then all must be saved, whether they believe or not; but if all are not saved, then Christ did not die for all; therefore, atonement is limited. Behind both these alternatives, however, Torrance (1986b:481; 1993:245, 246) finds two “very serious heresies.”

First, in regard to the Calvinist doctrine of limited atonement, there is a “disjunction” or dualism that bifurcates the divine and human natures of Christ, divides his being and his acts, and consequently separates the incarnation from the atonement. As Torrance (1986b:481) notes:

On this view the humanity of Christ is not regarded as having any inner ontological connection with those for whom he died, but is regarded only as an external instrument used by God as he wills, in effecting salvation for all those whom God chooses and/or for those who choose to accept Christ as their personal Saviour. Thus a separation can be made between the universal range of the Kingdom of Christ and the limited range of his atoning sacrifice.

Because it fails to appreciate the ontological connection between Jesus Christ and all humanity, a doctrine of limited atonement minimizes the significance of the incarnation for atonement by treating the humanity of Jesus Christ in an “external” and “instrumental” way. By reducing the atonement to a forensic transaction or the fulfilment of a legal contract between God and mankind, this view makes the Son’s humanity merely a tool used by God for a temporary repair job and then returned to the cosmic tool box in heaven (Torrance, 2009:182; cf. Kruger, 2003:36, Jesus and Undoing of Adam).

In addition to its merely external or instrumental nature, a doctrine of limited atonement implies a “restricted and partial” view of the incarnate Son’s assumption of fallen Adamic flesh and a consequent notion of partial rather than total substitution in the atonement. According to Torrance, hyper-Calvinist views of the atonement create a Nestorian dualism, or split, in the incarnate reality of Jesus Christ by asserting that the deity of Christ was in “repose” at the cross, so that the incarnate Son suffered in his humanity only (Torrance, 2009:184). Against this view, Torrance (1993:246; cf. 2009:184, 185; Torrance, et. al., 1999:29) argues:

If we really hold that it is God himself who bears our sins in Jesus Christ, God himself who in becoming man takes man’s place and stands with man under his own divine judgement, God himself the Judge becoming the man judged, then we cannot allow any divorce between the action of Christ on the cross and the action of God. How is it at all possible to think of the divine judgement in the cross as only a partial judgment upon sin, or a judgement only upon some sinners, for that is finally what it amounts to if only some sinners are died for, and only some are efficiently implicated in atonement? The concept of a limited atonement thus rests upon a limitation of the very being of God as love, and a schizoid notion of the incarnation, i.e., upon a basic Nestorian heresy.

For Torrance, a doctrine of limited atonement rests on a Nestorian dualism that breaks apart the hypostatic union with its implication that God is not intimately and personally involved in the suffering of Calvary; rather, only the humanity of Jesus Christ suffers on the cross. Since God is not involved at the cross, except by consent, the atonement can be construed in a restricted and partial, as well as external and instrumentalist way, wherein Jesus offers his humanity on behalf of the elect few only. On the other hand, against a Nestorian dualism between the deity and humanity of Jesus Christ implied in a doctrine of limited atonement (cf. Torrance, 1996c:19, 133), Torrance rightly asserts, along with the New Testament writers, that the one who died on the cross is the eternal Word made flesh, the very one by and through whom all things are created and have their being, and in whom hold together. Because all humanity is ontologically bound to the incarnate Creator Word, there can be no restriction to the atoning work of Jesus Christ.

In addition to a Nestorian dualism underlying the partial judgement implied in the doctrine of limited atonement is the second of the serious heresies Torrance finds in common arguments regarding both limited atonement and universalism: that is, a controlling framework of thought based upon “logico-causal connections.” As Torrance argues, the insertion of a logico-causal relation between the death of Christ and the salvation of men and women has led to a view that the atonement of Jesus Christ is “sufficient” for all but “efficient” only for some. According to the logic of this argument, if the atoning death of Christ applies to all men, then logically and causally all men must of necessity be saved; on the other hand, if some perish in hell, then logically and causally the efficacy of the atonement does not reach them. According to Torrance, this view was introduced into post-Augustinian high medieval theology, later rejected by Calvin, then reintroduced into Calvinist orthodoxy by Theodore Beza (1519-1605). The place of “logico-causalism” within Protestantism was considerably reinforced by the Newtonian view of “causal connections” between external entities such as atoms or particles, a view that gave rise to the hard determinism of hyper-Calvinistic notions of predestination and limited atonement. As Torrance notes, the ongoing problem of universalism versus limited atonement attests to the deep entrenchment of the Latin heresy in Protestant and Evangelical thought, wherein atonement continues to be reduced to a logical framework of cause and effect (Torrance, 1986b:481, 482; 1993:245, 246).

At the heart of the “logico-causal” (i.e., “if . . . then”) assertions regarding universalism and limited atonement, Torrance (1993:246-249) finds “two fatal interconnected errors” that completely “shatter” the argument. First, to posit a logico-causal connection between the atonement and the forgiveness of sins is “falsely to project into the atonement a kind of connection which obtains between finite events and statements about them in our fallen world, and to substitute it for the transcendent kind of connection that is revealed in the creative and redeeming activity of God himself.” As Torrance argues elsewhere (1981b:135, 136), a logico-causal approach to the atonement, as particularly evident in Calvinist Scholasticism, attempts to read back into God the temporal, causal, and logical relations characteristic of human experience in the world. This forced Calvinist Scholasticism to connect “the relative apparent distinctions” between believers and unbelievers to the absolute decree of God, thereby forcing the construal of predestination into the double form of election and reprobation. The doctrine of double predestination, however, entailed a dualism in the heart of God, “an ultimate ‘Yes’ and an ultimate ‘No,’” that could not be explained away by regarding the “No” of reprobation as only the “passing over” of some rather than their deliberate damnation. Calvinism was trapped in its own logic, notes Torrance. While there is a “logic of grace” exhibited in the pattern of God’s grace in the incarnation, life, death, and resurrection of Christ, wherein “he acted under the freely accepted constraint of his unreserved self-giving for our salvation,” to construe the logic of grace in terms of necessary, logical connections is to convert grace into something other than itself, for such a construal implies that there is not a “free, contingent relation” between the self-giving of Christ in the cross and human salvation but, rather, a “logico-causal” relation.

In a similar vein, Torrance argues that a doctrine of universalism commits the “logical fallacy” of “transmuting movement into necessity.” That is, universalism destroys the free decision of faith by making salvation necessary rather than possible. For Torrance, universalism can, at best, only be expressed in terms of “hope” or “possibility,” but never in terms of dogmatic necessity (Torrance, 1949:313; 1996c:277). It is the construal of a logico-causal relation between grace and human salvation that gives rise to the “twin errors” of both limited atonement and universal salvation (Torrance, 1981b:136).

As Torrance (1993:246, 247) wisely notes, the miraculous acts of God cannot be construed in the ordinary categories of human thought, for they operate from a “transcendent presence in which his being and act and Person are integrated in the power of his triune being.” Torrance finds this transcendent connection in the virgin birth, the resurrection, the miracles of divine healing, and the multiplication of a few loaves and fish. As Torrance argues:

Jesus Christ is the resurrection and the life, and that cannot be construed within a system of this-worldly logico-causal relations. The kind of connection that obtains in the atoning death of Christ was demonstrated in the resurrection of Jesus. The connection between the atoning death of the Lord Jesus and the forgiveness of our sins is of an altogether ineffable kind which we may not and cannot reduce to a chain of this-worldly logico-causal relations. To do that comes very near to sinning against the Holy Spirit.

As Torrance rightly argues, there is no “logical-causal” connection between the death of Jesus Christ and the forgiveness of sins. Rather, the connection between the cross and human salvation is an ineffable mystery hidden in the heart of the Triune Godhead, one that cannot be captured within the bounds of ordinary categories of human thought. As Torrance (1981b:136) cogently notes, if human salvation is dependent on a logical connection between the death of Jesus Christ and the forgiveness of sins, “we would all be unforgiven whether we believe or not.”

The second fatal error in logico-causal arguments for universalism or limited atonement, wherein attempts are made to explain why some are finally saved and others are not, involves a “rationalisation of evil.” For Torrance, a doctrine of universalism fails to take into account the irrational nature of the “mystery of iniquity” and the “abysmal irrationality of evil,” realities that cannot be explained away rationally, for to do so would mean that God need not have taken the way of the cross in order to save humanity. Evil involves a “radical discontinuity” that cannot be explained in terms of logico-causal relations (i.e., “continuity”) without explaining it away. Evil is so “bottomless,” or “abysmal,” that to overcome it requires nothing less than the direct presence and power of the eternal, infinite God (Torrance, 1949:313; 1996c:277; 1993:247). Torrance (1993:247, 248) argues:

In order to redeem us from the enormity of evil God “had to” become incarnate in our mortal existence and penetrate into the chasm of our sinful and guilty separation from himself, which he freely did on the cross out of his unlimited and unstinting love. Conversely, the fact that God himself, God incarnate, penetrated into our damned existence and death in order to save us, reveals the bottomless chasm and the irrational, inexplicable nature of evil by which we are separated from him. If then anyone thinks he can explain why the atoning death of Christ avails efficaciously only for some people but not for all through offering a logico-causal explanation, he is really putting forward an argument which is tantamount to doing despite to the infinite agony of God Almighty at Calvary, for he does not consider the fearful nature of sin and evil which cost God the sacrifice of his own beloved Son.

For Torrance (1993:248), both universalism and the doctrine of limited atonement are “twin heresies which rest on a deeper heresy,” that is, the recourse to a logico-causal explanation of why the atoning death of Christ avails or does not avail for all humanity. As Torrance pointedly argues, “Any such an attempt at logico-causal explanation of the efficacy and range of the atonement is surely a form of blasphemy against the blood of Christ.”

References: See previous posts.